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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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The Foreign policy of Britain under Churchill had been to give support
and provide war material to anyone who was willing to " fight the Hun."
But unfortunately one of the members of ihe Alliance who had duly
received this support began to employ the same methods as the Germans
in order to achieve the same goal. Churchill's Government found itself
up against a blank wall. From that moment., its foreign policy became.,
at the same time, vague and involved, it was a policy where every effort
was made to assist the aggrandisement of the Soviet Union and to subvert
every attempt on the part of her victims to save themselves. In the earlier
stages of the Great Alliance, when it was still uncertain as to when and
how the war would end and the hypothesis had to be taken into account
that Germany would survive as a Power, the theory of a common German-
Russian frontier, so useful for Britain in the maintenance of the Balance
of Power in Europe could be admitted. In 1944^ however, after the
successful invasion, the end of Germany was in sight—and her annihi-
lation as a military factor. And yet in spite of this, Churchill's policy
unshaken, stubbornly followed the path of complete appeasement.
It would seem futile to explain the problem by a series of simple slogans
and formulae forced to the surface of life in this era, such as £ peace at
any price,5 * world co-operation ' and so forth. Heretofore any nation
endangered by a more powerful neighbour always held the belief that
somewhere north or south, west or east, somewhere behind the horizon
there was a friendly nation from whom they might expect succour.
After Versatile, the peoples of the Middle Zone had turned to France and
Britain. And when at the end of the Second Great War this Britain was
bending before Russia and seeking in her turn for support, it meant
that she for some reason felt herself weak. Materially she was extremely
strong, but it grew more and more apparent that her leading class had lost
the desire of expansion and faith in England's traditions^ her destiny
and—her will to fight. The frontiers of the British Empire were well
defined and there was only one thought—to keep them untouched.
Britain had entered the phase of her life when she was prepared to
fight only in the event of being attacked. According to the Soviet
theoriticians this was the most characteristic symptom of her decay—
(a theory they applied to Western Civilisation generally), at any rate it
certainly seemed a sign of stagnation.
Britain had plans for herself but not for the world and she seemed
unwilling to cope with the great problems, the solution to which was
made so urgent by technical progress. The tree whose growth has been
arrested will rot sooner or later—British political thought had become
confused, and the boldest even among her representatives dare not say
—we must fight over Europe to save humanity and we must take over the
responsibility of leadership. They were concerned with the future of
their people only—to provide each family with a house and each citizen
with a pension—and that was all. The external danger of Europe in